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5. The Rise of English Parliamentary 
Government (1603-1789) 
IX p. 31 
The century in which Richelieu and Louis XIV fashioned an 
absolute dynastic state in France is noteworthy in English his-
tory for a very different reason. While the stage was being 
set for Louis XIV to declare, if he wished, "I am the state," 
E-.ru;ilishmen wer_e._.es tablishj n~ ±he princi..p_l.e_,_that all Yol j tical 
authori I limited a . This idea, which 1S ca l e c on-
---~t1 . na 1sm, was surely not new, having had its roots in 
English, feudal, and medieval history . But, what is profoundly 
significant for Western Civilization is that this idea became 
an operative political principle in late seventeenth century 
England. In the eighteenth century the English successfully 
devised a frame of government which preserved the gains which 
they had made earlier . 
We have already seen that the death of Queen Elizabeth I 
in 1603 left her successors in a perplexing situation. There 
was a growing sentiment against the successful absolutist ten-
dencies of the Tudors. There was dissatisfaction with the com-
promise religious settlement which Elizabeth had arranged. 
Finally, because the rising level of prices had rendered the 
customary royal revenues increasingly inadequate to balance 
expenditures, and because the queen was loath to request new 
taxes from Parliament, the treasury was empty . 
The successor of the Virgin Queen was a Stuart cousin, 
twice removed, who ruled as James VI in Scotland and as James I 
in England (1603-1625). For more than a century his Tudor pre-
decessors had studiously avoided making a frontal attack on the 
powers of Parliament . They accepted the principle that l aws 
are made b the kin and Par ~e~, acting together, and tried 
to control that body without making t e1r an more obvious 
t~an was absolutely necessary. This was a policy which re-
quired great perseverance and tact, qualities for which James 
Stuart was not distinguished. J ames brought with h i m f~om 
Scotland the conviction · · w~ tne on y 
lg itimat ru rder~ form of ove ent, and that therefOEe 
parliaments should play a role distinctly i nferior to the king. 
When Parliament refused t o grant the new revenues whi ch he re-
quested, James proceeded to scrape money together as best he 
could. His rei gn was a succession of battles with Parliament, 
which he dissolved whenever it opposed him. His efforts to 
control the judiciary led Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) , chief 
justice of the Court of Common Pleas, to resurrect the half-
forgotten Magna Carta and proclaim that it stood in the way of 
the king's efforts to exceed his lawful authority. 
James' political views also brought him into immediate 
conflict wi t h the Protestant dissenters in England. When a 
group of persons wishing to reform the Anglican church conferred 
with him to propose certain changes along Pur itan lines (1604), 
~-~~~-/)~~ b~d~d~· ~4 );~. "'J~,- JA-SP.LiA/YV · {lAt. ZN - ~<&?. /'~. ~--=-=~)i;~ ~ -r · . 
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James sputtered : "I shall make them confor m themselves or I 
will harry them out of the land, or else do worse." The Pur-
itans wished to introduce Calvinist theology, simplify ritual, 
and eliminate episcopacy from the Church of England . The king 
had read his Hooker : every man is a member of the English com-
monwealth and also of the Church of England . He drew from this 
the conclusion that anyone who wished to make innovations in 
the religious settlement must also harbor designs against the 
monarchy itself . "No bishop, no king," he declared. Religious 
dissent was thus equated with political disloyalty. 
Outright violence was averted during the reign of James I. 
It soon became evident that his son, Charles I (1625-1649), was 
equally determined to be free of legislative control. When 
Parliament voted him certain revenues fo r one year only instead 
of for his entire reign, as had been customary in the past, arid 
when it condemned his favante minister, the king dissolved it. 
In 1628, in return for a grant of f u nds f r om another Parliament, 
Charles agreed to sign the Petition of Ri~~t . In subscribing 
to this document he promised not to levy taxes without the con-
sent of Parliament, not to quarter soldiers in private homes or 
establish martial law in peacetime, and no t to order arbitrary 
arrests . Englishmen now consider the Petition of Right one of 
the foundation stones of their libert~ almost on a par with 
Magna Carta . But Charles felt scarcely more bound by it than 
John felt bound by the earlier document . He soon dissolved 
Parliament and ruled England without it for a per1o eleven 
years {1629-1640). 
It is certain that, during this interval, Charles did not 
think of himself as a cruel tyrant, entitled to vent his pas-
sions on the English people . Nor did he expect them to think 
thu s of him . ~e was the king chosen b God to rule En land, 
and was now rulin it as--- o r 11 inten e t at it should 
governed . T e k i ng worked hard and administere a a1rly hon-
est and efficient government . He dar ed no t impose new taxes 
and, therefore, had to cu t expenses t o the bone and resort to 
other devices to . obtain money . H~ sold monopolies on certain 
basic co .vived er la sed feudal law whicn his 
~ ould discover ~olator$ of whi c h e r e e eavily. 
For example, it was once the duty of seab oar d towns to equ1p 
naval vessels, but the custom had fallen into disuse . The king 
revived and extended it, collecting "ship money" in lieu of the 
former services. Meanwhile, Charles and his advisers made 
changes in the worship of the Chur ch of Eng land which offended 
and aroused the Puritans still further . Some 60,000 of them 
left England for the New Wor ld. A large number remained at 
home, seething with discontent . 
( 
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but another had to be summoned befor e the e nd of 1640 , Given 
the state of the cou ntr y, i t was i ne vitable t hat once in ses-
sion earljame~ would make a strong a nd de t e r mined bid to limit 
the king. Under the leader ship of John Pym (1584-1643) and 
others, some of Charlesw chief s uppor ter s were impeached and 
executed, and his finan c ial p r actices o f e leven years were 
condemned , Pa liament fo r ced the king to discl · 'rrht to 
dis ve it and owledge that f uture Par liaments should 
least o ce t bJ;:_ee e. r , I n r eturn, he was 
money to meet the Scottish invas i on , Meanwhile, re-
broke out in Ireland , Char les paused in his campaign 
against the Irish long enough to commi t a n i r r eparable blunder. 
In 1642 , when Parliament was momentarily divided on the ques-
t ion of how far to limit the king , he ent e r ed the House of 
Commons at the head of some troops t o a r rest f ive of its mem-
bers who wer e his outspoken opponent s , The a t t emp t having 
failed, he issu ed a c a ll to a r ms a gains t Par l i ament , In reply, 
Parl i amen t began p assing laws wi oyal a ppr oval and r aised 
forces of its own , This meant c i v il wa r , 
By no means al l Englishmen de s e r t e d t he ki n g , In general, 
Anglicans and Catholics , who included mos t o f the nobi lity, 
rallied to his s uppor t , The opposi ti on c ame mostly from the 
south and east of England and cons i s t e d p r i ma r i ly of religious 
dissidents who, it happens, cons t ituted a lar ge par t of the 
middle class , It i s al t oge t her appr opr iat e t o c onsider the 
English Civil War one of the religiou s war s , for by now the 
political and r elig ious opposi t ion whi c h confron t ed James I at 
the beginning of the centu ry ha d coalesced in t he Pur itan move-
ment , 
I n 1644 the k i ng s u f _ mi l i t ar defeat at the hands 
of h i s o ponen s , he par liamentary major J. ·y , - ich had al-
r eady made moder ate changes in the Anglican c hurch along Pres-
byterian lines, was ready to end the war upon the king ' s promise 
to accept the pol it i cal a nd r eligi ou s si t uation as it then 
stood , Howev e r 1 the army now ent e r e d the p i ctu re and prevented 
a ny s uch set tlement f r om taking p lac e , The mil i t a r y leaders 
wer e hostile bot h to t he Pr esbyte r i a n moder ates in control of 
Pa rliament and· t o t he ki ng , They defe ate d Charles in battle 
and he s urrender ed i n 1646 , Then i n 1648 t he army pur ged the 
Hou se of Commons of a ll but i t s mor e radical member s , What re-
maine d si t ting was the "R1l.Ullp Parl iament , " whi ch p r oceeded to 
e x ecu t e the king (1649) and d e clar e t ha t Engl a nd was now a com-
monweal t h having neither k i ng nor l o r ds , 
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England then passed to a fo r m of gover nment known as ~he 
Pro_teeto :t:.at _e..- A wr1 t ten cons t i tu t 1on , the I ns trument o f Govern-
ment, was drawn up (1653), significant because it was the first 
such document of modern times and the only one the English ever 
t r ied . The Instrument of Government made Cr omwell lord pro-
tector for life , established a u nicamer al par liament, and made 
Calvinism with a congregational polity the state r eligion . This 
constitution failed to provide England wi t h the anticipated 
regular government . No mor e successful than wer e his predeces-
sors with their legislatures, Cromwell soon dissolved Parliament 
and eventu ally ruled as a military dictator . His control of 
the army kept him in power unt i l his dea th i n 1658 . In spite 
of his effort s, he had failed t o gener a t e much popu lar enthusi-
asm for the Puritan settlement , Gener al pr osper ity at home and 
a popular anti-Spani sh and anti-Du tch policy abr oad help explain 
why there were no serious attempts to overth r ow the dictatorship 
du ring Cromwell ' s lifetime . 
There was no one to replace the lor d p r o t ector in 1658. 
His son succeeded him but soon abdicated . Ne gotiations were 
then begun to call back Par liament, which declared that "the 
gover nment is and ought to be by King , Lor ds , and Commons." 
The monarchy was recalled in the per son o f the son of Charles I, 
who was proclaimed king as Charles II in 1660 . The Re~toration 
had begun . 
In the midst of the Civil War an English philosopher and 
t u tor who had fled to France completed a modest-sized volume 
which has become one of the most influential political writings 
of moder n times . Thomas bbes ( 1588-1679) , by his own admis-
sion, was a timid an ear ful man . He at t ribu ted these traits 
to his mother 1 s fri ght just pr ior to his prematu re birth 9 upon 
hear ing of the impending a r rival o f t he Spa nish Armada . Hobbes 
lived thr ough · times which were f u ll of t u rmoil at home and 
abroad . He and fear , Hobbes once wr o t e, like twins, were born 
together. Law and order were par ticul a r ly appealing to him. 
Hobbes was deeply interes~ ili sical sciences . He 
had contacts with such men as Fr ancis Bacon, Gali1eo, and Des-
car tes . He thought of himself as a mathemat i cian and scientist, 
an opinion challenged both during h i s l ifetime and He 
was convinced that o u ht wou ld have to the 
method of the h sical sciences if it wer e to 
a ccura_e . Hobbes accepted t e seven een cen 
~analysis of the universe in which natur e and man -- all things 
-- consisted of only matter and motion . The fi r st 
Lev i athan ( 1651) , there f ore, is an int r odu c t i on to 
t e eve of a theor of sycholog which is 
y_hy sics ..._ 
( 
( 
( 
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as James I, but 
?C1entific anaJ ysis ~ hyman nat ure . He described man as he 
saw h 1m in an abst r act or fictitious state of nature and then 
took the idea of a contract, which i n itself went far back into 
the Middle Ages, · as the instrument throug h which society and 
government come into existence , Because of the dreadful al-
ternative to government -- war and the decay of society, as 
Hobbes saw it -- there was no real justification for ever break-
ing the contract, as the English had done . 
The Leviathan was widely read at the time it appeared and 
has been the subject of much debate for thr ee centuries. Men 
who have not accepted the Hobbesian evaluation of human nature 
or agr eed with his explanation of the social contract have 
often felt compelled to use Hobbes as a star ting point for their 
own interpretations , 
PART I . Of Man 
Chapter VI 
Of the Interior Beginnings of Volu ntar y 
Motions; commonly called the Passions; 
and the Speeches by which they are expressed 
There be in animals, (two sorts of motion~ peculiar 
to them : one called vital; begun in gener ation, and con-
tinued without inter rup t 1on thr oug h thei r whole life; 
such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the 
breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc., 
to which motions there needs no help of imagination: the 
other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion; 
as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such 
manner as is first fancied in our minds , That sense is 
motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, 
caused by the action of the things we see, hear , etc.; 
and that fancy is but the relics o f the same motion, re-
maining after sense, h a s been al r eady seen in the first 
and second chapters , And because going, speaking, arid 
the like voluntar y motions, depend always upon a preced-
ent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evi-
dent, that the ima ination is the f irst internal begin-
nin of all v - ary mo 1on , a oug ur.tsf"Ucf:ied men 
do not conceive any mo 1 n t all to be there, where the 
thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in is, 
for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not 
hinder, but that s u ch motions a r e , For let a space be 
never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, 
whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over 
that , These small beginnings of motion, within the body 
of man, before they appear i n walking , speaking, striking 
and other visible actions, are commonly called endeavour. 
This endeavour, when it is towar dsomething which 
causes it, is called appetite, or desire; the latter, 
being the general name; and the other oftentimes restrained 
~~-~ ~0~~~r~~ ;:~- . 
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to signify the desire of good, namely hunger and thirst. 
And when the endeavour is fromward something, it is gen-
erally called aversion . . , , For Nature itself does often 
press upon men those t r uths, which afterwards, when they 
look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For 
the schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no 
actual motion at all: but because some motion they must 
acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion; which is 
but an absurd speech : for though words may be called 
metaphorical, bodies and motions c a nnot . 
( 
That which men desire, they are also said to love: 
and to hate those things for which they have aversion. 
that desire and love are the same thing; save that by 
desire, we always s ign ify the absence of the object; by 
love most commonly the presence of the same. So also by 
aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the pres-
ence of the object . 
~ Of appetites and aver sions, some a r e born with men; 
as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, 
which may also and more p r oper ly be called aversions, 
from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some other 
appetites, not many . The rest, wht c h are appetites of 
particular things, proceed from exper ience , and trial of 
their effects upon themselves or other men . For of 
things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can 
have no further desire than to taste and try. But aver-
sion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt 
us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, 
or not . 
Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we 
are said to contemn ; -ontem t b · o- no..tb.ing._e.lse b:ut an 
immobiliX~, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the 
·ac~ion of certain things; and proceeding from that the 
heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent 
objects i of f r om want of experience of them . 
And because the constitution of a man's body is in 
continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same 
things should always cause in him the same appetites and 
aversions : much less can all men consent, in the desire 
of almost any one and the same object . 
But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite 
or desi r e, that ·is it which he for his part ca+leth good: 
and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his 
contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of 
good, evil, and contemptible, are e ver u sed with relation 
· to the person that useth them : there being nothing simply 
and absolutely so ; nor any common r u le of good and evil, 
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; 
but from the person of the man, where there is no common-
wealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the pe r son that rep-
resenteth it ; or from an arbitrat or o r judge, whom men 
disagr eeing shall by consent set u p, and make his sen-
tence the rule thereof .. .. 
As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as 
I have said befor e, only motion, caused by the action of 
~ '~~~ fi :.d;C &~~· ~~. -aj /w£ ~~- ' -e.) /~ ~ . ·~ ~wd.u??'lh<./~ 
(~) . 
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external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light 
and colour; to the ear, sou nd; to the nostril, odour, 
&c. : so, when the action of the same object is continued 
from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the 
real effect there is nothing but motion, or .endeavour; 
which consisteth in appetite, or aver sion, to or from the 
object moving , But the appearance, or sense of that mo-
tion is that we either call delight, or t r ou ble of mind . 
This motion, which is called appetite, and for the 
apparence of it delight , and pleasure, seemeth to be a 
corrobor ation of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and 
therefore s u ch things as caused delight, were not im-
properly called jucunda, a j u vando, from helping or for-
tifying; and the contrary-molesta, offensive, f r om hinder-
ing, and trou bling the motion vital . 
' Or sense of good; and molestation , or displeasu re, the ap-
fi Pleasure therefore, or delight, is the apparence, ) 
\
/ par ence, or sense of evil , And consequently all appetite, 
desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more 
or less ; a nd all hat r ed and aver sion, wi t h mor e or less 
displeasure and offence. . 
Of pleasures 9r delights, some a r ise from the sense 
of an object present; and those may be called pleasure of 
sense; the word sensu al, as it is ~~ftd by those only that 
condemn them, having no place tilf -the r e be laws. Of this 
kind a r e all onerations and exonerations of the body; as 
also all that is pleasant, in the sight, hear ing, smell, 
taste, or touch . Other s arise from the expectation, that 
proceeds from fo r esight of the end, or consequ ence of 
things; whether those things in the sense please or dis-
please . And these are pleasu res of the mind of him that 
draweth those consequences, and are generally called joy. 
In the like manner, displeasures are some in the sense, 
and called pain ; other in the expectation of consequences, 
and a r e called grief .. . , 
Chapter XII I 
As of the Natur al Condition of Ma nkind as 
concer ning thei r Fe licity a nd Miser y 
Jat l'l r e ~adc men sa e gua + , _in t he faculties o - he //, 4~ 
bgdy · and · · as that thou gh th _ mm _ o.n_e _ a some-~ ~
1mes manifestly s t ronger i n body , o r o f qu Lcker mind ~~ 
J»~ er et when all is r eckoned together, the dif · 
fe n c between man and man 1 is not so considera ~. as 
that one man can thereu pon claim to himself any benefit, 
to which another may not pr etend 9 a s well as he . For as 
to the st r ength of body, the weakest has s trength enough 
to kill the strongest, ei t her by secr et machination, or 
by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger 
with himself . 
And as to the facul t ies of t he mind, se t ting aside 
the arts gr ounded upon words, and especially that skill of 
proceeding upon general and infallible -rules, called sci-
ence; which very few have, and bu t in a f ew things; as 
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being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, 
as pru dence, while we look a f ter somewhat else, I find 
yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength. 
For prudence is but experience; which equ al time, equally 
bestows on all men , in those things they equ ally apply 
themselves unt o , That which may per haps make such equal-
ity incredible, is but a vain concei t of one's own wisdom, _ 
which almost all men think they have in a greater degree 
than the vu l gar; t hat is, than all men bu t themselves, 
and a few others, whom by fame o r fo r concurring wit h 
themselves, they approve . For such is the nature of men, 
that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be 
more witty, or more eloquent, o r mor e lear ned; yet they 
will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; 
for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a 
distance . But this proveth rather that men are in that 
point equ al, than u nequ al , For the r e is not ordinarily a 
greater sign of the equ al distr i bu t i on of a nythi ng, than 
that every man is contented with his s har e . 
Fr om this equality of ability ~ariseth equ ality of 
hope in the attaining of our ends , And ther efore if any two 
men desire the same thing , which never theless they cannot 
both enjoy , they become enemies; and in the way to their 
end, which is principally their own conser vation, and 
sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy or 
subdue one another . And from henc e i t comes to pass, that 
where an invader hath no more to fe ar than another man's 
single power ; if one plant, sow, build, o r possess a con-
venient seat , others may p r obably be expected to come 
prepar ed with fo r ces u nited, to dispossess and deprive 
him, n~ only of the f ruit of his labou r , but also of his 
life or liberty . And the i nvade r again is in the like 
danger of another.,,. 
So that in the natu re of man, we find three principa 
uses of qu a rrel. First, competition; secondly; diffi-
nce; thi r dly, glory . 
The fi r st, maketh men i nvade fo r gain; the second, 
fo r safety; and the third, for r epu tation . The first use 
violence, to make t hemselves mas t ers of other men's per-
sons, wives, children, and c attle ; the second, to defend 
them; the third, fo r t ri fles, as a wor d, a smile, a dif-
ferent opinion , and any other si gn of u nder valu e , either 
di r ect in their per sons, or by r e f lec tion in their kindred, 
thei r f r iends, thei r nation, t hei r p r ofession, or their 
name . ~ 
Her eby is manifest. that du ring the t ime men li lZE~- nf! ·-Jd~:;; 
wl thou t a common power to keep them all in awe, they are ~~rr~ 
that condition which i s called war; and s u c h a war, as i~ r~. 
o ! every man, aga1ns t ever y man . For war consisteth not {- ~~~ 
in a tle o , e act of fighting; bu t in a tract of ~~! 
time, wherein the will to contend by battle is s u fficiently 
known ~ and the r efor e the notion of t i me is to be con-
sidered in the nature of war, as it i s in the natu re of 
weather . For a s the natu re of fou l we a the r lieth not in 
a shower o r two of r ain, bu t i n an inclinat ion thereto of 
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many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not 
in actual fi ghting , bu t in the known disposition thereto 
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. 
All other time is peace. 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, 
where every man is enemy to every man, the same is con-
sequent to the time wherein men live without other secur-
ity than what their own strength and their own invention 
shall furnish them withal. In s u ch condition there is no 
place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, 
and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, 
nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; 
no commodious building; no instruments of moving and re-
moving such things as require mu ch fo r ce; no knowledge of 
the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts, no 
letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continu~l~ . 
fear and danger of violent death ; and the life of m~ ~~ 
solitar~. poor, nasty, brutish, and shor t , ~- / 
~ It may seem strange to some man, that has not well 
weighed these things, that Nature shou ld thus dissociate, 
and render men apt to invade and dest r oy one another; and 
he may therefore, not t r usting to this inference, made 
from the passions, desire perhap s t o have the same con-
firmed by exper ience . Let him ther efor e consider with 
himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks 
to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his 
doprs; when even in his house, he locks his chests; and 
this when he knows there be laws, and pu blic officers, 
armed, to reveng e all inj ur ies shall be done him; what 
opinion he has of his fellow-su bjects, when he rides armed; 
of his fellow-citizens, when he locks his door s; and of 
his children and servants, when he locks his chests. Does 
he not there as mu ch accuse mankind by his actions as I do 
by my words? But neither of us accu se man's nature in it. 
The desires and other passions of man are in themselves 
no sin . No mor e are the actions that p r oceed from those 
passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which 
till laws be made they c annot know, nor can any law be 
made till they have agr eed u pon the pe r son that shall make 
it . .. . 
~o this war of every man, against ever y man, this also 
is coliS"equent; that noth1ng can be unjust . ~he notions of 
right and wrong, j u stice and inj ustice , hav~ there no 
place . Whe r e there is no common power, there is no law) 
where no law, no injust~· e. For ce and f raud, are in war 
the two cardinal virtues . ustice a · · ·ce are none 
of the faculties neithe of the body nor mind . If they 
were, they might be in a man that wer e alone in the world, 
as well as his senses, and passions . They are q 11al j tieit 
that re ate to men in society, no . in so i ude. It is 
consequent also to lie same condition, that ther e be no 
propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but 
only that to be every man 1 s that he can get; and for so 
long, as he can keep it . And thu s much for the ill condi-
tion, which man by mere nature is actu ally pl a ced in; 
_A£~~ ~IZ q~~, 
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though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting 
p artly in the p assions, partly i n his reason. 
-~b~e~p~a~s~s~i~o~n~s~t~h~a~t~l~·n~c~l~i~n~e~m~e~n~t~o~~~~~a.~-f~e~a~r~~f?d~~ ~-
death; desire of such things -: z~;~~~-
mod lous lVlng · an a 10pe 
em. And reason suggesteth 
p eace, upon which men may be drawn to a greement. These 
articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of 
Nature:. ) , 
Chapter XIV 
Of the First and Second Natural Laws, 
and of Contracts 
The ri ght of Na:t.yre, which writers commonly call jus 
na tur le, is thJ liber.t~ a.Gll-ma a.:tlJ. , to use h · n--
p~, as ~ll himself, o he preservation of his 
Qw. atu e; that iS to say, of his own 1fe; and con-
""sequently, of doing anything , which in his own judgment 
and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto . . 
By liberty, is understood, according to tpe proper sig-
nification of the word, the absence of external impedi-
ments: which impediments may oft take away part of a man's 
power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from 
using the power left him, according as his judgment and 
reason shall dictate to him. 
A l aw of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or gen-
eral r ule, found out by-reason, by which a man 1S forbid-
den to do t n a t which is destructive of his life, or 
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit 
that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For 
though they that speak of this subject, use to confound 
jus and lex, ri ght and law: yet they ought to be distin-
gllTshed;-oBcause ri ght , consisteth in liberty to do, or 
to forbear; whereas law, determineth and bindeth to one 
of them; so that law and right differ as much as obliga-
tion and liberty; which in one and the same matter are 
inconsistent . 
And because of the condition of man, as hath been de-
cl red in the precedent chapter, is a condition of war of 
e ery one against every one; in which case every one is 
overned by his own reason; and there is nothing he can 
ake use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserv-
ing his life a gainst his enemies; it followeth, that in 
such a condition, every man has a ri ght to everything; 
even to one another ' s body. And therefore, as long as 
this natural ri ght of every man to everything endureth, 
, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise 
~~ver he be, of living out the t i me, which Nature ordin-
arily alloweth to live. And consequently it is a precept, 
or general rule of reason, "that every man ought to en-
deavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and 
when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all 
~~:H-;~;~;::z~ ~~~)~/~~~ ~~ fo-- K?~;>&/vr:?Z. ( u..c lf~~~tf.ff~ 
t'ud..~~~~~, 
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containeth the fir ~n fu~damental l ture; 
· " seek eace and fo llJ it~ The second, the 
ID-.-O-"~:&a:e-~J..gru;_oL..N.a.tu~ : which is, "by all means we 
to defend ur.se.l:v.es . " 
From this fundamental law of Nature, by which men are 
commanded to endeavour peace , is der ived this second law; 
"that a man be willing , when others are so too, as far-
forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think 
it necessary, to lay down this ri ght to all things; and be 
contented with so much liberty a gains t other men, as he 
would allow other men against himself . " For as long as 
every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; 
so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other 
men will not lay down their r i ght, as well as he; then 
there is no reason for any one to divest himself of his : 
for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is 
bou nd to, rather than to dispose himself to peace . This 
is that law of the Gospel; "whatsoever you re uire that 
others should do to you that do e to " 
ever a man t r ans err e h his right , or renounceth 
it ; it is either in consideration of some right recipro-
cally transferred to himself; or fo~ some other good he 
hopeth for thereby . For it is a voLuntar y act : and of 
the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good 
to himself . And therefore there be some rights, which no 
man can be understood by any words, o r other signs, to 
have abandoned or transferred . As fi r st a man cannot lay 
down the ri ght of resisting them that assau lt him by 
force, to take away his life; becau se he cannot be under-
stood to aim thereby at any good to . himself. The same 
may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment; both 
because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; 
as there is to the p atience of suffering another to be 
wounded, or imprisoned; as also because a man cannot tell , 
when he seeth men proceed against him by violence , whether 
they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive and 
end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right 
is introduced, is nothing else but the secu rity of a man's 
person, in his life, and in the ~~ans of so preserving 
life , as not to be weary of it . ~d therefore if a man 
by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the 
end, for which those signs wer e intended; he is not to be 
understood as if he meant i t , or that i t was his will; but 
that he was ignor~t of how such words and actions were 
to ~interpreted. ) 
The mutual transferring of ri ght , is that which men 
cal ontract . . ·) 
PART II . Of Commonwealth 
Chapter XVII 
Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition 
of a Commonwealth 
~he final cause, end, or desi gn o f men, who naturally love~iberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction 
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of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them 
live in commonwealths, is the foresi ght of their own 
preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that 
is to say, of g~ing themselves out from that miserable 
condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as 
hath been shown chapter xiii, to the natural passions 
of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in 
awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance 
of their covenants, and observation of those laws of 
Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters. 
For the laws of Nature, as justice, equity, modesty, 
mercy, and, in sum, "doing to others, as we would be done 
to," of themselves, without the terror of some power, to 
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natu ral 
passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, 
and the like. And covenants without the sword are 
words, and of o s rength to secu re am 1 . There-
fore notwithstanding the laws o Natur e, which every one 
hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when 
he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or not 
great enough for our security; every man will, and may 
lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution 
against all other men. And in all places, where men have 
lived by small families, - to rob and spoil one another, 
has been a trade, and so far from being repute_d against 
the law of Nature, that the greater spoils they gained, 
the greater was their honour; and men observed no other 
laws therein, but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain 
from cruelty, ~aving to men their lives, and instruments 
of husbandry. ~nd as small families did then; so now do 
cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families, for 
their own security enlarge their dominions, upon all pre-
tences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance 
that may be g iven to invaders, and endeavour as much as 
they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open 
force and secret arts, for want of other caution, ju,tly; 
and are remembered for it in after ages with honour~ . 
+he only way to erect such a coromon p qwer. as may be 
able t end them from t :nvasion of fore· ers, ~ 
in ur1es o one an ere e em 
in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the 
fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live 
contentedly, is, to co fer all their QOWer and strength ~ ~ 
ne assem men a rna d ce-t :~ 
plurality of vo1ces u nto o ~: ~p~ 
o say, o appoin one man, assem-zt~~ 1 -
bly of men, to bear their person; and ever y one to own, ~Y~~ 
and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that 
so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, 
in those things which concern the common peace and safety; 
and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, 
and their judgments, to his judgment , This is more than 
consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in 
one and the same person, made by covenant of every man 
with every man, in such manner, as if every man should 
( 
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say to every man, "I authorize and g ive u p my right of 
to this assembly of men, 
u p thy right t o him, and 
manner. " This done, 
_ __....,...__,o~n~e-PJ call ed a cominon- .._ 
~Ms · he gene.r,..a :t.l. oll O:f : :tii oJI-~~ 
...;.::._;;~;::;:e;;:r:=:.: ,,_ t o speak more reverently, oi- __../;t;;;U· ~
o under the i ortal G. . , . ~~ 
our For y is a u thority, g iven him 
tiy every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the ~~~ 
use of so much p ower and strength confer red on him, that 
by terror ther eof , he is enabled to perform the wills of 
them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid a gainst the i r 
enemies abroad , And in him consisteth the essence of the 
commonwealth ; which, to define i t, is "one person, of 
whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one 
with another, have mad e themselves ever y one the author, 
to t he end he ma y u se t he st r ength and means of them all, 
as he shall think e xpedient, for their peace and common 
defence . " 
And he that carrieth this person is called sovereign, 
and said to have sovereign power; and e very one besides, 
his subject. 
The attaining t o this soverei gn p ower is by two ways. 
e, by natu ral f orce; as when a man maketh his childre 
o s u bmit themselves, and their childr en, to his govern-
ment, as being able t o destroy t hem i f t hey r efuse; or by 
war subdu eth his enemi es to his wi ll, g iving them their 
lives on that condition. The other is, when men a g ree 
amongst themselves to submi t to some man, or assembly of 
men, volunt arily , on confidence to be p r otected by him 
a gainst all others. This latter may be called a pol i tica 
commonwealth , o r commonwealth by i nsti tution; and the 
former, a commonwealth by acquis i ton . An d fi r st, I shall 
speak of commonweal t h by institu tion. 
Chapter XVII I 
Of the Ri ghts of Sover eig ns by Institu tion 
A commonwealth is said to be instituted, wh en a multi-
tude of _men do a g ree , and covenant, eve r y one, with every 
one, that to what soever man, o r assembly of men, shall be 
g iven by the major p a r t, the ri ght to p r esent the person 
of them all, that is to say, to be thei r r epresentative; 
every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted 
a gainst it, shall authorize all the act i ons and judgments, 
of that man, or assembly of men, i n the same manner, as 
if they were his own , to the end, to live peaceably amongst 
t hemselves, and be protected a gainst other men. 
From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all 
the ri ghts and faculties of him, or them, on whom sovereign 
powe~is conferred by the consent of the people assembled. 
(~irst, because they covenant , it is to be understood, 
they ~re not bliged by former covenant to anything repug-
nant hereu nto And consequently they that have already 
· i( 
I !· 
.. . .... 
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instituted a commonwealth, being ther eby bound by covenant, 
to own the ac tions and judgments of one, cannot lawfully 
make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to 
any other , in any thing whatsoever , without his permission. 
And ther efor e, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot 
without his leave cast off monar chy, and r eturn to the 
confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their 
person f r om him that bea~eth it, t o another man, or other 
assembly of men; for they' are bound, every man to every 
man, to ow~ , and be repu ted author of all, that he that 
already is their sovereign, shall do, and j udge fit to be 
done : so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should 
break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice: 
and they have also ever y man given the soye r eignty to him 
that bear eth thei r person; and ther efor e ~f the~ depose 
him, they take f r om him that whic is own and so agai _ 
it ~s injuf?tice . . . . 
1 
• . 
-~econdly, becaus e the right of be aring the person of 
hem all, is given to him they make s over eign, by covenant 
only of one to anot her , and not of him to any of them; 
there can happen no br each of covenant on the part of the 
sover eign : and consequently none of his s ubjects, by any 
pretence of forfei t ur e, can be freed f r om his s ubjection .... 
. . . The opinion that any monar ch r eceiveth his power 
by covenant, that is to say, on condition , proceedeth from 
want of under standing this easy t r uth, that covenants being 
bu t wor ds and breath, have no force t o oblige, contain, 
constr ain, or protec~ any man, but what it has from the 
public sword; that i s, from the united hands of that man, 
or assembly of men that hath the sovereignty, and whose 
actions ar e avou~hed by them all, and per formed by t · 
1 strengt h of them all, in him uni tecf. ~ -.. Thir dly, because the major part hath by consenting 
voi ces declared a sover eign; he that dissented must now 
~onsent with the r est; that is, be contented to avow all 
the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed 
r est ., . , 
, Four thly, because every s ubject is by this institution 
(
author of all the actions and j1Jdgments .of the sove~eign 
instituted, it -_ fQ~,Iows· , that wha tsoever he. doth .it ·.can \)»e 
ilo .injury to. any of hi.:$ subjects, nor ought he . to· be by any 
of them -accused of i njustice . , ., · . 
. Fifthly., and consequently to that which was said . 
last, no man that hath sovereign power _can justly be ·p-ut . to 
death, ·or otherwise in any manne;r by his subje.ct~ ;punishe4 . 
For seeing every subject is auth<:>r of the, actions o'*f. ht's 
sover eign, ·he punisheth another for the .actions committed 
by himself . ~ , . 
~~ it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge 
of what opinions and doctrines are aver se .and what conduc-
ing to peace ; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, 
and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to mul-
titudes of people, and who shall examine the doctrines of 
all books before they be published , For the actions of men 
pr oceed from their opinions, and in the well governing of 
-//~~~~ A . 
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opinions consisteth the well- governing of men's actions, 
in order to their peace and concord . And though in mat-
ter of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded but the 
truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating the same 
by peace . For doctrine repugnant to peace can be no more 
true than peace and concord can be a gainst the law of 
Nature . . . . 
Seventhly, is annexed to the soverei gnty, the whole 
power of prescribing the rules, wher eby every man may 
know what goods he may enjoy , and what actions he may do, 
without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects; and 
this is it men call propriety . .. . 
Ei ghthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the ri~~t 
of judicatur e ; that is to say , of hearing and deciding 
ai l controversies, which may arise concerning law, either 
civil or natural, or concerning fact . . . . 
N..inthlL is annexed to the soverei gnty, the r),.ght ...Q.f 
making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths; 
t fiat is to say, of judg ing when it is for the public good, 
and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid 
for that end; and to levy money upon the subjects to de-
fray the expenses thereof . . .. 
T~nthl , is annexed to the sovereignty, the~ 
~ - counsellors ministers, magist t and officers, 
J toth i 12~~ nd. ar. o r see1.ng the sovereign 
charged with the end, which is the common peace and de-
fence, he is understood to have power to use such means 
as he shall think most fit for his discharge . 
~' to the sovereign is committed :the power 
of rewardi with riches or honour, a~d £6f punishing with 
corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy ;' every 
subject according to the law he hath formerly made; or if 
there be no law made, according as he shall judge most to 
conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the common-
wealth, or deterring of them from doing disservice to the 
same .. . . 
These are the ri ghts, which make the essence of sover-
eignty; and which are the marks whereby a man may discern 
in what man, or assembly of men, the sovereign power is 
placed and resideth . For these are incommunicable, and 
inseparable. The power to coin money; to dispose of the 
estate and persons of infant heirs; to have pre-emption in 
markets; and all other statute prerogatives, may be trans-
ferred by the soverei gn; and yet the power to protect his 
subjects be retained. But if he transfer the militia, he 
retains the judicature in vain, for want of execution of 
the laws : or if he grant away the power of raising money, 
the militia is in vain; or if he g ive away the government 
of doctrines, men will be fri ghted into rebellion with the 
fear of spirits . And so if we consider any one of the 
said rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of 
all the rest will produce no effect, in the conservation 
of peace and justice, the end for which all commonwealths 
are instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is 
said, "a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand : " for 
;;/tJ ;~~~y~· 
( 
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unless t hi s division precede, d i v ision i nto opposite arm-
ies can never hap pen . I f there had not first bee n an 
opinion received o f t he greatest part of England , that 
these powers were divided between t he Ki ng , and t he Lords , 
and the House of Commons, the p eople h ad never been di -
vided and fallen into 'this civil war; f irst between those 
that disagreed in politics; and after between the d i s-
senters about the liber ty of rel i g ion; which have so in-
structed men in this point of s overeig n ri g ht, that there 
be few now in England that do not see that these rights 
are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged at 
the next return of p e a ce; and so cont inue, till their 
miseries a r e for got t en; and no longe r, e x cept the vul gar 
be better taught than they have hitherto been .. . . 
But a man may here object, that the c ond i t i on of sub-
jects is very mi s erable ; as being obnoxi ous to the lusts, 
and other i rre gular pass i ons o f him o r t hem t h a t have so 
nlimited a power in t he ir hands . And c ommonly t hey that 
live under a monarch, think it t he fault of monarchy; and 
they that l ive nder the gave nmen t of d emocracy , or other 
soverei gn assembly, attribu te all the inconvenience t o 
that form of commonwealth ; whereas the power in all forms, 
if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; 
not considering that the stat e of man can never be with-
out some incommodity or other; and that t he greatest, 
that in any f orm o f gover nment can p ossibly happen to the 
people in general, is scar ce sensible, in respect of the 
miseries, and hor rible calami ties, that accompany a civil 
war , or that dissolute condition of masterless men, with-
out subjection to laws, and a coer cive p ower to tie their 
hands from rapine and revenge ~ nor considerin g that the 
greatest pressure of sovereig n governors proceedeth not 
from any deli ght, or profit they can e xpect in the damage 
or weakening o f their subjects, i n whose vi g our consisteth 
their own st r eng t h and g lo r y; but i n the r estiveness of 
themselves, that unwilling ly contributing to their own 
defence, mak e it necessary for their governors to draw 
from them what t hey can in time o f peace, that they may 
have means on any emergent occasion , o r sudden need , to 
resist, or take advantage on the ir enemies . For all men 
are by nature provided of notable mu ltiplying glasses , 
that is thei r passions and self-love, through which every 
little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are desti-
tute of those prospecti ve g las s es , namely , moral and civil 
science , t o see afar off the mi s eries t ha t hang over them, 
and cannot without s u ch payments be avoided . 
Chapter XX 
Of Dominion Paternal, and Despo t ical 
. . . it appeareth plainly , to my understanding, both from 
reason and Scripture, that the sovereig n power, whether 
placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of 
men, as in popular and aristocrat i cal commonwealths, is as 
great as possibly men can be imag i ned to make it . And 
( 
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though of so unlimited a p ower, men may fancy many evil 
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, 
which is perpetu~ war of every man agains t his nei ghbour, 
are much worse . ~he condition of man in t his life shall 
never be without 1nconveniences; but there happeneth in 
no commonwealth any g r eat inconvenience bu t what proceeds 
from the subject's disobedience, and breach of those cov-
enants, from which the commonwealth has its being, And 
whosoever thinking sovereig n power too great, will seek 
to make it less , mus t s ·~ibject himself to the power that 
can limit it; that is to say, t o a gre ater\ 
~e great est objection i s, that o f t~ practice; 
when men ask whe r e and when s u ch power has by subjects been 
acknowledged . But one may ask them again, when o r where 
has there been a kingd om long f r ee from sedition and 
civil wa . In those nations whose c ommonwealths have 
been long-lived , and not being des troyed but by foreign 
war, the subjec t s never did dispute o f the sovereig n 
power. But howsoever, an a rgument from t he practice of 
men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact 
reason weighed the cau ses and n a ture of commonwealths, 
and s uffer daily t hose miseries that proceed from the 
ignorance thereof, i s invalid . For thoug h in all places 
of the world men should lay the fou ndation of their houses 
on the sand, it cou ld no t thence be inf erred that so it 
ought to be . The skill of making and maintaining common-
wealths, consiste t h in c e rtain rules, as do t h arithmetic 
and g eometry; no t , as t ennis-play , on practice only : which 
rules neither poor men have t he leisure, nor men that have 
had the leisure, have hi t herto had t he curiosity, or the 
method to find out. 
Chapter XXI 
Of the Liber ty o f Subjects 
. . ~ut as men, f or the attai ning of peace, and conser-
vation of themselves t her e by, have made an artificial man, 
which we call a c ommonweal th; so a l s o have they made arti-
ficial chains , called civi l laws , which t hey themselves, 
by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips 
of that man, o r a ssembly, to whom the y have given the sov-
ereign power; and at t he other end t o t heir own ears . 
These bonds, in thei r own natur e but weak, may neverthe-
less be made to hold, by t he danger, t hough not by the 
difficulty of breaking th~ 
In relation to these bonds only it i s, t hat I am to 
speak now, o f the l i berty of s u b j ects . For seeing there 
is no commonwealth in the wor ld, wherein ther e be rules 
enough set down for t he r e gu latin g of all t he actions and 
words of men, as being a thing i mpossible; it followeth 
necessarily, that in all kinds of a ctions by t he laws 
pretermitted , men have the liberty o f d oing what their 
own r easons shall s uggest, for the most profitable to 
themselves . For if we take liber t y in the proper sense, 
for corporal liberty; that is t o say, f r eedom from chains 
< 
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and prison; it were very absurd for men to clamour as 
they do for the liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again, 
if we take liberty for an exemption f r om laws, it is no 
less absurd for men to demand as they do that liberty by 
whi c h all other men may be masters of t heir lives. And 
yet, as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not 
knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them, 
without a sword in the hands of a man, or ·men , to cause 
those laws to be put in execution . The liberty of a sub-
ject lieth therefore only in those things which in regu-
lating their actions, the sovereign hath pretermitted: 
such as is the liberty to buy and sell, and otherwise 
contract with one another; to choose their own abode, 
their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute 
t heir children as they themselves thi nk fi t ; and the like. 
To come now to the particulars of the true liberty 
of a subject; t hat i s to say, what are the things, which 
though commanded by t he soverei gn, he may nevertheless, 
without injustice , refuse to do; we are to consider what 
ri ghts we pass away, when we make a commonwealth; or, 
which is all one, what liberty we deny ourselves, by own-
ing all the actions, without exception , of the man, or 
assembly, we make our sovereign . For in the act of our 
submission consisteth both our obli gation, and our lib-
erty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken 
from thence; there being no obli gation on any man, which 
ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men equally, 
are by Nature free . And because such arguments must 
either be drawn from the express words , I "authorize all 
his actions," or from the intention of him that submit-
teth himself to his power, which intention is to be under-
stood by the end for which he so submitteth; the obliga-
tion and libert y of the subject, is to be derived , either 
from those words, or others equivalent; or else from the 
end of the institution of soverei gnty, namely, the peace 
of the subjects wi t hin themselves, and their de f ence 
against a common enemy . 
First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution, is 
by covenant of every one t o ever y one; and sovereignty by 
acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor, 
or child to the parent; i t is manifest, that every sub-
ject has liberty in all those t hings, the right whereof 
cannt! by covenant be transferr ed .. . . 
If the sovereig n command a man, though justly con-
demn d, to kill, wound, or maimhimsel f ; or not to resist 
those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of 
ood, air, medicine, or any other thing , without whic~ he 
cannot live; ~et hath that man the J j herty to disob£¥) J 
If a man be interrogated by the sovereig n, or his au-
thority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not 
ound, without assurance of pardon , to confess it; because 
rna . . can be obli rr nt to accuse · elf .... 
As for other de en on the silence of 
the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no 
;:;): ~~/~~~-djh<gf ~::z~ 
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rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or for-
bear, according to his own discretion. And therefore 
such liberty is in some places more, and in some less; 
and in some times more, in other times less, according as 
they that have the soverei g nty shall think most conveni-
ent. As for example, there was a time when, in England, 
a man might enter into his own land, and dispossess such 
as wrongfully possessed it, by force. But in aftertimes, 
that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute 
made by the king in parliament. And in some places of 
the world, men have the liberty of many wives; in other 
places such liberty not allowed.... ,J. 
The obli gation sub ·ects to the r is -~~ 
stood to he ower ~
lasteth b y wlliga a e i s a l3l e to p r ot ec t them . For the tMI /c_y~· 
..-right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none (twx l i::t;,.,/ d 
else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished.~~~ 
The sovereig nty is t he soul of the commonwealth, which ~· 
once departed from the body, the members do no more re-
ceive their motion f rom it. The end of obedience is pro-
tection, which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his 
own or in another's sword, nature app lieth his obedience 
to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. And though sov-
ereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be im-
mortal, yet i t i s in its own nature not only subject to 
violent deat h by foreign war, but also, throug h the i g -
norance and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very 
institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by in-
testine discord .... 
A Review, and Conclusion 
To conclude, there is nothing i n this whole discourse, 
nor in that I writ before of the same subject in Latin, 
as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the Word of 
God, or to good manners; or to the disturbance of the 
public tranquiliity. Therefore I think it may be prof-
itably printed, and more profitably taug ht in the univer-
sities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment 
of the same belongeth . For seeing t h e universities are 
the fountains of civil and moral doctrine , from whence 
the preachers and the gentry, drawing such water as they 
f i nd, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and 
in their conversation) upon the peop le, there oug ht cer-
tainly to be g reat care taken to have it pure, both from 
the venom of heathen politicians, and from the incanta-
tion of deceiving spirits . And by that means the most 
men, knowing t heir duties, will be t h e less subject to 
serve the ambition of a few discont ented persons in their 
purp oses a g ainst the stat e, and be the less g rieved with 
the contributions necessary for their peace and defence; 
and the governors themselves have the less cause to main-
tain at the common charge any g reater army than is neces-
sary to make g ood the p ublic l i berty a gainst the invasions 
and encroachments of forei g n enemies. 
~~#d,~-z;£-~ . 
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And thus I have brought to an end my Di scourse of 
Civil and Ecclesiastical Government, occasioned by the 
disorders of the p resent time, without partiality, with-
out app lication, and without other desi g n than to set 
before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection 
and obedi ence; of wh ich the condition of human nat ure 
and the laws divine, both natural and p ositive, require 
an inviolable observation. And thoug h in the revolution 
of states there can be no very g ood cons t ellation for 
truths of this na t ure to be born under (as having an 
angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old government, 
and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new), yet 
I cannot think it will be condemned at t his time either 
by the public judg e of doctrine, or by any that desires 
the continuance of publ i c p eace. And in t his hope I re-
turn to my interrup ted speculation of bodies natural, 
wherein , if God g ive me health to fin i sh it, I hop e the 
novelty will as mu c h p lease, as in the doctrine of this 
artificial body it useth to offend. For such truth as 
opposeth no man's profit nor p leasure is to all men 
welcome. * 
The terms by which monarchy was restored to Eng land in 
1660 are important. Charles II (1 660-1 68 5) a greed to subscribe 
to Magna Carta and the Petition of Ri g ht, and to accept the 
reli g ious settlement which Parliament would make. He a greed 
informally not to interfere with parliamentary economic poli-
cies. The last vesti ges of feudalism were formally abolished 
i n 1660, thus depriving the king of any possibili t y of gaining 
i ncom~ from that source. The kincr ro · d a re ular in-
c~, which was made larg e enoug h for him to mai ntai n a sizable 
court. However, it was not icient to Jermit him to follow 
olic of his own devising , ~ did it allow him to 
apg a ge in large-scale rl ery to g ain his ends. It is evident 
that in return i ng to monarchy responsible Eng lishmen had not 
yet deprived the king of all independent power. There was in 
effect what amounted to a~tleman's a g reement between Cha!}es 
II, who asserted that he did not want t o pack hi s bag s i n 
fli ght any more, and the la d ar i s now firmly en-
trenched in Parliament. This a g reement worked as long as the 
king and Parliament were in basic accord with each other. 
gparles !~was a pleasure-loving prince whose escapades 
led English society in a reaction a gainst the decade of Puritan 
severity. But he was at heart an absolutist who was determined 
to push his latitude under the gentleman's a g reement as far as 
possible without actually breaking the pact. He quarreled with 
and dissolved Parliaments as his father had done and was always 
looking for alternative sources of revenue. For many years, in 
* Adapted from Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: or The Matter, Form and 
Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical anarCTVTl (London_: ___ ---
George~outledge and Sons, 1885), pp . 31~, 63-67, 8 2, 84-89, 
99-101, 102-105, 320. 
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return for a pro-French forei gn policy , he was g iven an annual 
secret subsidy by Louis XIV, in whose court he had grown to 
manhood . Furthermore, harles had strong Ca tholic leanings. 
He opposed the reli gious se ement rna e y e An glican Par-
l .iament in the 1660's, with its discr i minations against those 
who refused to conform to t he Church of Eng land. The king him-
self was rece · t he Catholic church on ~il cl.~ ath-
bed in 168 5. 
Charles was s u cceeded by his brother,~ James II (1685-1688), 
who had been an avowed Catholic for many years. · A serious de-
bate ~had taken place during f e a t e r years of the preceding 
rei gn over whether James should be allowed t o succeed to the 
throne at all . One group, which acquired the name Jory~ de: 
fended the monarch _and James, although it was primarily Angli-
can . e o er group , ca - -ed the Whi gs, was varied in its 
composition but ~ni ted in cham£ioning_ arliamentary supremacy 
d in its fear o f a C~ihQJ~~c kipg. They dia not e 1eve at 
~ king could be loyal to England, faithful to the political and 
reli g ious set t lement of the 1660 1 s, and p roperly wary of France 
(now considered to be th~ chie f forei gn foe) while at the same 
time being a Roman Catholic. 
During his rei gn of three years James II did nothing to 
quiet Whi g fears or to i nspire much confidence in the Tories. 
He p roceeded to violat e the provisions of the reli gious settle-
ment and acted gener ally in an arbitrary manner. The event 
which finally precip itated revolution was the uoe~ ted bi th 
of a son in 1688 to th§..~g}e-aged king a :qg f?.jJ~. Ca.j;.holic, ~en . 
Before the month was out a moveme · a der ~ to invite 
~ames' Protesta ~on=in=~ngland . This son-in-law was 
the ruler of the Uni t ed Provinces, ~~e. His wife, 
Mary, was the Protestant daugh t er of James by a previous mar-
riage . When in November 1688 Will i am arrived in England with 
an army, much of the king' s army deser t ed. James himself fled 
to France and William entered London . 
In Februa~y_JJ&&a_ arliament r oc aim ~~and Mary 
j_oint §_Q.Yereigns of Engla11.d, a f ter declaring that ......___ 
King James the second, having endeavored to subvert the 
constitution of the k i ngdom, by breaking the original 
contract between k ing and people; and, by th~ advice of 
Jesuits and other wicked persons, having violated the 
fundamental laws; and having wi thdrawn himself out of the 
kingdom; has abdicated the government, and ... the throne 
is thereby vacant . 
These events constitute the GJor iQus Re yol yti on in English 
history. It was g lorious in the sense that few lives were lost 
and a ~inimym of bitterness genera!~d; but even more important, 
it was g lorious in t he a a ditional sense that it m~s ih~ achievemen ~ o f constitutional gmreromen t jp E !;!:gla~: ~he Eng-
l is h const · ~U- ·on is not a s · · :t, similar to 
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th e American constitut ion of 1787 . Rather it is a body of laws 
and cu stoms by which t he English ordered thei r political life. 
And at this time the body of laws was changi ng because the Eng-
lish wished to make certain important features of their consti-
tution very explici t . 
Both absolu te and divine- right monarch 
of the ast 1n g_la d . Without the consent o 
king could not make or re~l laws, ev , or maintain a 
standing army . To ~inimize his control of the m11 1 ary, ar-
l iament began voting appropriations and the power to discipline 
the army for only one year at a time . To r emove his control of 
the judiciary Parliament provided that judges should have fixed 
salaries and life tenure, and that they could be removed only 
by action of both houses, and not by the k ing . In 1701 the ~ct 
of Settlement provided that ithou t the conse f Parliame~ 
the king eu leave t he emu , ol ve En la ar, 
or- ap oint for eigner s to offi e . The ki_ng_ and hi s consort; had 
t o e Protestants . And, f inally , in the same act Parliament 
prescribed the line of succession t o the t hrone after the death 
of the childless Wi lliam, passing over many Catholic claimants 
to settle on a suitable Protestant heir . 
One by one the list of rights guaranteed to Englishmen by 
formal legislative ena ctment g rew . In 1689 the Toleration Act 
granted all non-Catholic Trinitarians the right to public wor-
ship, although it limited officeholding to Anglicans . In prac-
tice even those grou ps discriminated against worshiped as they 
pleased. Censorship was allowed t o lapse in the 1690's . When 
William and Mary came t o the throne, they were asked to sub-
scribe to a Declarat ion of Ri ghts, which was incorporated into 
law as the Bi ll o f Rights J n December 1689 , The reader mi ght 
compar e the following excerpt from it with parts of the French 
Declar ation of the Rights o f Man and o f the Citizen (1789) and 
with the American Bill o f Rights ( 1791 ) : 
Whereas the late King James the Second, by the assist-
ance of divers evil counsellors, judges and ministers 
employed by him, did endeavour t o subvert and extirpate 
the Protestant reli g ion and the laws and liberties of this 
kingdom ; 
By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with 
and suspending o f laws and the execution of laws without 
consent of Parliament; 
By commit tin g and prosecuting divers worthy prelates 
for humbly petitioning to be excused from concu rring to 
the said assumed power; 
By issuing and causing t o be executed a commission 
under the great seal for erecting a cour t called the Court 
of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes; 
By levying money for and to the use of the Crown by 
pretence of prerogative for o ther time and in other manner 
than the same was granted by Parliament; 
By raising and keeping a s tanding army within this 
kingdom in time of p eace without consent of Parliament, 
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and qu arter ing soldiers c ontrary to law; 
By causing several good s u bjects being Protestants to 
be disar med at the same time when papists were both armed 
and employed contrary to law; 
By violating the freedom of election of members to 
serve in Parliament; 
By prosecutions in the Cour t of Ki ng ' s Bench for 
matters and causes cognizable only in Parliament, and 
by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses; 
And whereas of late years partial corrupt and unquali-
fied persons have been r eturned and served on juries in 
trials, and particularly divers jurors in trials for hi gh 
treason whi ch were not freeholder s; 
And excessive bai l hath been r e quired of persons com-
mitted in c r iminal cases to elude the benefit of the laws 
made fo r the liberty of t he subjects ; 
And excessive fin®s have been imposed; 
And illegal and c rue l punishments inflicted; 
And several grants and promises made of fines and for-
feitures befor e any c onvict i o n or judgment against the 
persons upon whom t he same were t o be levied; 
All of which are utter ly and directly contrary to the 
known laws and s tatutes and freedom of t his realm; ... 
. . . [ the] Lords Spi r itual and Temporal and Commons, 
purs uant to t he-i r -respec-t.i ve le-t-ters and elections, being 
now assembled in a f u ll and free r epresentative of this 
nation, taking into the ir most seri ou s c onsideration the 
best means for attaining the ends aforesaid, do in the 
first place ( as their ancestors in like case have usually 
done) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient 
rights and liberties declar e 
That the pretended power o f suspending of laws or 
the execution of laws by r e gal au thority without consent 
of Parl i ament is illegal; 
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or 
the execution of laws by regal a thority, a s it hath been 
assumed and exer c i sed of late , i s i llegal; 
That the commiss i on f o r e r ecting t he late Court of Com-
missioners for Ecclesiastical Causes, a nd all other com-
missions and courts o f like nature, are i llegal and per-
nicious ; 
That levying money for o r to the u se of the Crown by 
pretence o f prer ogative, without grant of Parliament, for 
longe r time, o r in other manner t han t h e s ame is or shall 
be granted, is illega l ; 
That it is t he right of the s ubjects to petition the 
king , and all commitments and prosecutions for such peti-
tioning are illegal; 
That the raising or keeping a standing army within the 
kingdom i n time of peace, u nless it be with consent of 
Parliament, is a gainst law ; 
That the subjects which are Pro t es tants may have 
arms for thei r defence s uitable t o their conditions and 
as allowed by law ; 
That election of members of Par liament ought to be free; 
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That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings 
in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in 
any court or place out of Parliament; 
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted; 
That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned; 
and jurors which pass upon men in trials for hi gh treason 
ought to be freeholders; 
That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures 
of particular p ersons before conviction are illegal and 
void; 
And that for redress of all grievances, and for the 
amending, streng thening and preserving of the laws, Par-
liaments ought to be held frequently . ... * 
John Locke (1632-1704), in the preface to Two Treatises of 
Government (1690), expressed the hope that his ~orts would oe 
sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, 
our present King William-- to make good his title in 
the consent of the people, which, being our only one of 
all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly 
than any prince in Christendom; and to ·ustif o the 
~ the people of Englan9 whose love of their just and 
natural ri ghts, with their resolution to preserve them, 
saved the nati it was o sl 
On the face of it, then, Locke appears as an apologist for 
the Glorious Revolution, which Hobbes had not lived to see and 
which he would not have sanctioned had he survived. Born to a 
middle-class family which had fought on the side of Parliament 
during the Civil War, Locke received a good education, and for 
a time was a tutor at Oxford. He was interested in philosophy, 
science, and practiced medicine. He spent many years of his 
life as physician and secretary to the chief Whig nobleman, 
going with him to Holland when the noblemanfell out of favor 
with Charles II. Locke was in Holland when the Glorious Revo-
lution began, returning to England on the boat carrying the new 
queen. It was at this time that he published the three books 
on which his fame as a writer primarily rests, the ideas for 
which he had been developing for many years. Letters on Tole-
ration appeared in 1689, the same year in which the ToTerat~on 
Act was passed . An Essay concerning Human Understanding and 
Two Treatises on GOvernment fpllowed in the next year. Locke 
spent the finar-years of his life in government service and 
retirement. 
* Andrew Browning, ed., English Historical Documents, 1660-1714 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), VIII, 122-~ -u5ed 
with permission. 
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John Locke was more than an a e~l 
revolu tion . s we s a see in the following chapter, he was 
a lso more than merel a ~L!.O.li.:ti,.c~ iter . In seeki;ng to ex-
plain ,his yonvictjon t hat r evoluti on is sometimes justiJ ied, he 
cover ed much t he same grou nd that Hobbes -h ad covered befor e him; 
the state of natur e , the contract, society and g overnment. In 
so doing , he contri buted mightily to t he ideas of the American 
Revolution and the American political tradition . Beyond that, 
he has been one of the surest wellspr ings of political liberal-
ism in Western Civilization . 
The first o f the two trea ises is a refutation of the 
theory of the di · e ~ght of __ ~~ which t he steps taken by 
Par 1amen had thoroughly discredited in England. The excerpt 
which follows is fr om The Second Treatise of Civil Government 
(1690 ) : 
Chapter II 
Of t he State o f Nature 
4 . To u nder stand political power right, and derive 
it from its original, we must cons ide r what state all men 
are u all in, and that is a state of perfect freedom 
to o r der their ac t..i,Qns _ a.ll i s ose of their ossessio"D:§ 
..:.;::_..;::.=..:::.:::..:::;__=.-= .:.::.-.=.:- - ~ . ., --
and persons as t hey thi Dk fit, withi;n the bounds of the 
raw of nature, withou t af3king leave or depending upon the 
will of any other man . 
~tate alsn~~ty; wherein all the power and 
j u risdiction is r eci r 1 , no one having mo re t han an-
other; there being nothing mor e evident than that crea-
tures of the same spe cies and r ank, promiscuously born to 
·all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same 
facu l ties , shou ld also be equal one amongst another with-
ou t subordination o r subjection; unless the lor d and 
master o f them all shou ld , by any manifest declaration of 
his wi ll, set o ne abo ve another, and confer on him by an 
evident and clear appointment an undoubted ri ght to domin-
ion and sovereignty . . .. . 
6 . But ~gough . this · be ~a s tate o.f ~ l i.Q.¥.tl~ , yet it is J~.ot a s tat¥. o :L_U:cince; thou gh man t n that state have an 
uncont r ollable liberty to dispose of his person or pos-
sessions, yet b_e has 1 not liberty to destroy himss¥ , __Q1:_ 
so much as any c r eature i n his possession, but where some 
nobler use than its b a re preservation calls for it. The / 
state of nature has a law of naty~ to govern it which /l L, /" 
obliges ever y one ; _..and r eason,_ wlh ch is that law, teach§S ~/c;~ / 
all mankind who wi ll bii'Fciii'ISu l t it ~t, - being afi e_gual 1 
d independent, o one h t _ to har · - . · h is Life, f 
health -1 ' or p ossessions ; for men being a e 
wor anship o f - one 0111 o ent and infinitely wise Maker 
-- a ll the servants of one sover eign master, sent into 
the wor ld by his order, and about his business -- they 
are h i erty whose wor kmanshi the _ ~re, :p1ad,e. to la~ .. t 
d'Ur i g lU..§ n L..orle-a.~.o.tber 1 s, JJleasur~ :. and being furn-
ished with like f acult ies, sharing ail in one community 
~~~~~?"'~· ~f~a-dJ':J(~· . ~ }?t~w~ . 11t~~fod-A~~~ db~~-
~ . ~dzf --.:d;~-<-..- ,- ~ ~ ~) 
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The Glorious Revolution had placed the ultimate responsi-
bility of governing England in the hands of Parliament, but it 
did not provide the executive machinery through which Parlia-
ment could perform that task. Such machinery developed gradu-
ally in the century after 1689. King William (1689-1702) found 
it convenient to choose his ministers from the party having a 
parliamentary majority. With few exceptions, his successors 
followed this p ractice. Charles II had met with his advisers 
in a small room called a cabinet. This term caught on and was 
soon applied to the chief royal ministers. 
The reign of William, himself a believer in absolute mon-
archy, was dominated by war with France. One of the results of 
the Glorious Revolution was a reorientation of English foreign 
policy against France. In order to get the necessary financial 
support from Parliament, Wi lliam was satisfied not to antagon-
ize that body over domestic affairs. His successor was his 
sister-in-law, Anne (1702-1714), who was the last Britis.la-m-en-
arch to use the GW - • In accordance with the Act of Set-
t-r , upon her death the throne passed to the elector 
of Hanover, who ascended the throne as George I (1714-1727). 
George much preferred to live in Germany, where he was an abso-
lute monarch, and never learned to speak English. Neither he 
nor his son, Georg e II (1727-1760), was popular in England. 
These royal Georges were tolerated because they were Protestants 
at a time when there was an active Catholic Stuart pretender to 
the throne and also because they generally left control of the 
* Jphn Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas I. Cook 
(The Hafner Li orary of ClassiCs) (New York: Hafner Publishing 
c~ 194 7) pp. 122-1~, 127, 129, 133-137, 184-186 , 188-196, 
203-204, 233-238, 24 6-247. Used with permission . 
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government in other hands. 
Because Geor ge I was frequently absent from England and not 
consistently interested in day-to-day affairs when he was pres-
ent, he stopped attending meetings of the Cabinet. But someone 
had to be responsible for exercising leadership in the Cabinet 
and representing it before Parliament. Between 1721 and 1742 
that function was performed by Sir Robert Walpole (1676-1745) , 
who held the title of Chancellor of the Exchequer and F i rst Lord 
of the Treasury. Walpole is considered to have been the first 
prime minister of Eng land. During his long tenure he was able 
to dominate the Cabinet, setting a precedent by forcing the 
dismissal of several ministers who opposed his polici es. He 
was also the leader of the Whig party, which then had a major-
ity in Parliament. But he owed his original appointment and 
his continuance in office to the king . 
George III (1760-1 820) was the first of the Hanoverian mon-
archs to have been born and reared in England. He was proud of 
his native country, and this pride was reflected in his popu-
larity when he came to the throne. Early in his reign George 
attempted to change the direction which English political de-
velopment was then taking . There is no evidence that he wanted 
to upset the distinguishing features of the British political 
system as they had appeared since 1689. He wanted to become an 
active a gent of government: first, by picking and controlling 
his ministers; and second, by building up, through bribery and 
patronage, a party of the "king's friends" in Parliament. 
This attempt by George III reached its climax during the 
ministry of Lord North (1770-17 82). During that time some mem-
bers of Parliament decided that the royal effort should be 
checked. In 1780 the House of Commons resolved that the "influ-
ence of the crown has increased, is increasing , and ought to be 
diminished . " In 178 2 a resolution was presented expressing a 
lack of confidence in the North Cabinet. It failed of adoption, 
but when the threat was made to introduce it again, Lord North 
resi gned. England had now virtually achieved a system called 
cabinet , or parliamentary , government. This is a system in 
which the working executive, which in this case is the Cabinet, 
headed by a prime minister, is responsible for its authority 
and its tenure to the legislature. The details of this arrange-
ment remained to be worked out during the next half century of 
British constitutional history, but the main outlines were al-
ready clearly evident. 
